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Introduction
In Ariosa v. Sequenom, the Federal Circuit and the district courts
attempted to draw the line to determine the point at which a diagnostic
method so transforms a natural principle by human invention that it
becomes patent-eligible subject matter. 1 Section 101 of the United States
Code states that “whoever invents any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent
therefore.” 2 However, the Supreme Court has long excluded laws of
nature, abstract ideas, and physical phenomena (hereinafter collectively
referred to as a “natural principle,” “natural phenomenon,” or “natural
law”) from patentability under § 101. 3 For example, the Supreme Court
held in Myriad that genomic DNA itself is not patent-eligible because it is a
natural phenomenon and not the product of human ingenuity, regardless
of whether it had been isolated from the surrounding DNA by human
means. 4 The issue becomes more complicated, however, when the
question is directed at diagnostic methods that put natural principles to
use. Generally, diagnostic methods are processes used to diagnose,
detect, or determine a course of treatment for a disease. 5 Diagnostic
methods and tests may incorporate natural phenomena in many ways:
through the use of DNA, 6 concentration relationships, 7 or schedules for
determining optimal vaccination times. 8 The diagnostic methods at issue
in Ariosa were directed to a novel use of cell-free fetal DNA (“cffDNA”).
Prior to the diagnostic method patented in the Ariosa case, cffDNA had
been discarded by medical professionals in the field as nothing more than
1.

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
This Note will use the encompassing term ‘natural principle’ or ‘natural
phenomena’ to refer collectively to laws of nature, abstract principles, and
physical phenomena as noted in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.

2.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).

3.

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).

4.

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2017, 2116
(2013).

5.

U.S.
NAT’L
LIBRARY
OF
MED.,
DIAGNOSTIC
TESTS,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/diagnostictests.html (last updated Dec.
22 2015).

6.

See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1373; See also Genetic Technologies Ltd.
v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 24 F.Supp.3d 922, 928 (N.D.Cal. 2014).

7.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305
(2012).

8.

Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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waste matter. 9 The new diagnostic method used cffDNA to conduct noninvasive fetal testing. 10
Prior jurisprudence has held that “a process is not unpatentable
simply because it contains a law of nature.” 11 The Supreme Court has
warned against an overly broad interpretation of these exclusions,
because all inventions on some level rely on natural principles. 12 The Court
has held that claims directed to a process that encompasses a natural
principle may be patent eligible when the process is transforming or
reducing one item to a different state or different item and when there
are aspects of novelty involved in the invention that go beyond the
discovery of the natural principle. 13
Though Sequenom—the company that invented the diagnostic
method at issue in Ariosa—petitioned for its case to be reheard en banc,
the Federal Circuit denied the petition. 14 In his concurrence with the
denial of Sequenom’s petition, Judge Lourie urged reconsideration of “a
rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of patent
eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural phenomenon plus
conventional steps, or that they claim abstract concepts.” 15 He further
stated, “it is said that the whole category of diagnostic claims is at risk. It is
also said that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may be upon
us, and there seems to be some truth in that concern.” 16
The primary problem with the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods
is the lack of clarity in the current patent subject-matter eligibility test
employed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
and the courts. Particularly, there needs to be clarification regarding
whether the discovery of a natural law is sufficient to make a combination
of steps otherwise well known in the field into a patent-eligible method,
or whether the steps themselves must also be novel contributions. The
lack of clarity means there is confusion between the USPTO, the district
courts, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court about which diagnostic
methods are patent-eligible uses of a natural phenomenon. This confusion
leads to an excess of litigation—the USPTO grants a patent on a diagnostic
test, only to have that patent invalidated by the court system when it
becomes the subject of an infringement suit. A clear test for determining
9.

See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1373.

10.

See id.

11.

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).

12.

Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294.

13.

Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185.

14.

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert denied (No. 2014-1139) (Lourie, J., concurring).

15.

Id. at 1285.

16.

Id.
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whether a particular diagnostic method is eligible for patent protection
would prevent the inconsistency between the standards used by the
USPTO and the ones used by courts and would give companies certainty
that their products are either patent protected or not. The current tests
not only fail to offer guidance in the area of diagnostic tests, but also add
to the confusion by using language ill-fitting the biotechnology field. 17
Section I of this Note begins by providing a brief overview of what
diagnostic methods are and whether or not their patent eligibility is a
worthy goal. The section discusses the rationales behind patent protection
in general and the arguments for and against the patenting of diagnostic
methods in particular.
Section II traces the history of jurisprudence in the area, from
decisions based solely on whether a claim entirely preempts a natural
phenomenon, to the current Mayo v. Prometheus Two-Step test. This
section then summarizes some of the problems with the current tests as
they stand. Section III is an analysis of Ariosa v. Sequenom and its
implications for decisions on the patent eligibility of diagnostic tests. The
section outlines the facts and holding of the case and compares them with
Genetic Technologies v. Agilent in order to highlight the confusion
remaining in the field. 18
Section IV explores the idea of importing language from §§ 102 and
103 of the patent code into the § 101 analysis to serve as a framework for
the patent-eligibility test. This section outlines the analyses used to
determine whether a patented invention is novel and non-obvious and
provides an overview of jurisprudence relating to those determinations.
Section V suggests a framework for a new patent-eligibility test to be
applied to claims directed to diagnostic tests. The new test proposes a
three-step system that begins with an application of the Supreme Court’s
Mayo Two-Step test, and wherein the language of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
103 is imported to clarify the meaning of terms as they apply to the
biotechnology and medical fields. Failing the Mayo Two-Step creates a
rebuttable presumption of unpatentability that can be overturned by the
second and third steps of the proposed test. The section ends with an
application of the newly proposed test to the diagnostic test at issue in
Ariosa.

I.

What are Diagnostic Methods and Why Patent Them?

Medical-technique and medical-procedure patenting is a controversial
area. The Patent Office Board of Appeals has held that methods of
treatment with varied likelihoods of success are not patentable due to
17.

See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1296-99 (problems interpreting
terms such as ‘inventive concept’ and ‘transformation’).

18.

Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 922, 926-933 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
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their uncertainty. 19 In general, medical procedures without a sufficiently
certain result were not granted patent protection for fear that the public
would equate a patented procedure with one that had a higher likelihood
of success. 20 However, this decision left the door open to patenting for
procedures that resulted in a sufficiently certain result, such as those used
to diagnose diseases, rather than treat them. 21
Diagnostic methods, also known as diagnostic tests or simply
diagnostics, are medical tests that are used to identify a disease and track
its progression. 22 The term can also be used for applications such as
genetic testing, where medical professionals are not identifying a
particular disease but rather a series of characteristics, such as sex. 23
There are many reasons why patent protection for diagnostic tests is a
desirable outcome and also many reasons to proceed with caution in
establishing an overly inclusive system.
A.

35 U.S.C. § 101: Patent-eligibility Rationales

To understand why the decision in Ariosa is, in the words of
Sequenom, “an existential threat to patent protection for an array of
meritorious inventions,” one must first look to the underlying rationales
for allowing patents themselves. 24
1.

Rewarding Innovation: Why do we patent?

Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power “to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 25 The law incentivizes
innovation by rewarding those who make a novel contribution in their art
with a limited monopoly that brings with it a potential financial profit.
Patent law encourages inventors to invent and to disclose those
inventions to the public where they will do the most good. The law seeks
to ensure that new innovations will reach the public domain, hence the
19.

JOANNA T. BROUGHER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: BALANCING
INNOVATION AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 68 (2014); See also Ex Parte Brinkerhoff, 27 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 793, 798 (1945).

20.

See BROUGHER, supra note 19, at 68.

21.

Ex parte Kettering, 35 USPQ 342, 343 (P.O.B.A. 1936).

22.

Morgan Medlin, Transformation of Diagnostic Method Patents: Why Changes in
Biotechnology and the Law Make Evolution Necessary, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J.
627, 628 (2014).

23.

See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2015).

24.

Brief of Petitioner-Appellant for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1139).

25.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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written disclosure requirement, the enablement requirements, and the
limits on patent terms. 26 Furthermore, patent law requires that advances
currently in the public domain remain there, hence the novelty and nonobviousness requirements codified in §§ 102 and 103. 27
Without the patent system, it is argued, inventors have no external
motivation to bring the science and progress behind their inventions to
the public domain and may instead opt to keep them secret in order to
retain a monopoly over their production and use. 28 Instead of disclosing
their invention via patent specification, inventors would opt to use tradesecret law. Unlike obtaining a patent, protecting an invention through the
use of trade-secret law does not require that the inventor disclose
anything about how their product is made. 29 Though the public would still
have access to the invention itself, the science behind its production
would remain a secret. This is a great detriment to the public, as it
prevents others from building off of those innovations to create further
public benefit. Patent law is a compromise, enticing inventors to share
their secrets for the promise of a limited monopoly in order to ensure that
the flow of information, human progress, and innovation is not stemmed.
In order to receive a patent, inventors must submit a fully detailed
description of their work, which is then published and available to all. 30
This system ensures that while inventors receive the direct benefit of their
inventions in terms of capturing the market, the research that they have
done is available to others as a resource or building block for future
inventions. Without the promise of a limited monopoly, inventors would
be more likely to keep the details of their inventions and research secret
to monopolize the market.
In particular, the field of diagnostic tests is one in which advances are
made with great frequency. Patent protection ensures that researchers
have the motivation and funds to continue their work, while also ensuring
that the science behind the innovations comes to the public light.

26.

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (the written disclosure and enablement
requirements of subsection (a) require that a patent specification contain a
description of the invention that is detailed enough so that a person of ordinary
skill in the area of the invention would be able to make and use the invention);
See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (the term of a patent lasts 20 years from the
date the application was filed); 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (the term of a patent lasts 20
years from the date the application was filed).

27.

35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012).

28.

Kristen Nugent, Patenting Medical Devices: The Economic Implications of
Ethically Motivated Reform, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 135, 137 (2008).

29.

Id. at 154, 171.

30.

35 U.S.C. § 112.
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Patent-Eligible Subject Matter and Undue Preemption

Despite these rationales—and in some cases, because of these
rationales—there are still areas where courts have limited patent
eligibility to prevent certain types of discoveries and inventions from
receiving patent protection. 31 Natural principles and undue preemption
serve as some of the principles behind these limitations.
Patent law seeks to ensure that information that is currently in the
public domain remains there. Section 101, as interpreted by the Court,
deems natural phenomena, abstract ideas, and products of nature
unpatentable subject matter under the theory that they already belong to
the public. They are considered “part of the storehouse of knowledge of
all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” 32
Accordingly, the courts are loath to allow patents that claim natural
principles themselves.
The historical bar on patents claiming natural principles comes from
the courts’ aversion to undue preemption. Undue preemption occurs
when a patent either claims a natural principle itself or claims such a
broad application of the natural principle that there is no way to use the
natural principle itself without infringing upon the patent. 33 Undue
preemption removes a natural principle from the public domain because
all other uses of the principle would infringe the preempting patent. For
example, in Diamond v. Diehr, the invention concerned a machine that
functioned by using the Arrhenius equation to determine when to open a
rubber mold so that the rubber would be fully cured. 34 Diehr could not
have patented the Arrhenius equation itself, even had he discovered it,
because the equation is a natural principle; it merely describes
mathematically a relationship that exists in nature. However, the Court
allowed him to patent one particular use of the equation, because it did
not prevent others from using the equation in a different situation. 35
Some preemption is inherent within the patent system and is, in fact,
what the system itself is built on, but in the case of undue preemption, the
detriment to the public good outweighs the benefit to the inventor.
Diagnostic testing is an area ripe for problems of undue preemption.
For example, in Mayo v. Prometheus, the claimed method at issue was a
method for calibrating the dosage of thiopurine drugs in treating
31.

Patent Law – Patentable Subject Matter – Federal Circuit Invalidates Diagnostic
Method Claims as Drawn to “Abstract Mental Processes.” – Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 125 HARVARD L. REV. 658, 663 (2011).

32.

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).

33.

Dan Hoang, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Clinic’s Gift to the Biotech
Industry: A Study of Patent-Eligibility of Medical Treatment and Diagnostic
Methods after Bilski, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 457, 469 (2011).

34.

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).

35.

Id. at 192-3.
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autoimmune disease. 36 The patent claimed the actual correlation between
the thiopurine-drug dosage and the amount of thiopurine metabolites in
the body. This is a claim directed at the underlying natural principle itself,
not a claim directed at an application of that principle. Claiming the
underlying natural law, rather than a specific application of it, preempts
any other uses of that natural law without first licensing the patent that
claimed it. In Mayo, allowing a patent on the correlation between
thiopurine drugs and the metabolites they create in the body would stop
anyone else from using that correlation for diagnostic or research
reasons. 37 Preemption of that magnitude would stifle the free flow of
information that is necessary for the continuing advancement of the
sciences.
B.

Arguments Against Patentability

One of the main arguments against granting patents to diagnostic
tests is the effect on the public’s access to medical treatment. 38 Patents
raise the costs of diagnostic tests because they create market exclusivity,
allowing companies to charge whatever they would like due to the lack of
competition. 39 Companies then pass on the increased costs to the medical
industry and, by extension, to the consumers themselves. Higher prices
mean that some consumers will be unable to afford necessary diagnostic
treatments. Lack of patent protection would allow for a competitive
market, which has the potential to lower prices, increasing access for
consumers who need diagnostic treatments.
Another strong argument raised against patent protection for
diagnostic tests is that they may in some ways restrict access to
information. 40 In other ways, as discussed in Section I.A, patent protection
may also aid in the disclosure of information. Many types of research build
on the foundation of preceding tests and discoveries that came before.
Over-patenting or overbroad patents themselves can create a thicket of
licensing issues that exponentially raise the cost and difficulty of research.
If claims directed at a diagnostic test are overly broad, they may preempt
all other uses of the natural phenomenon on which the diagnostic test
relies.
Furthermore, there is a public-health concern that allowing the
patenting of diagnostic treatments will open the door to patentinfringement suits against doctors. 41 Because patents on diagnostic tests
36.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290
(2012).

37.

Id. at 1294.

38.

BROUGHER, supra note 19, at 87.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 88.

41.

Id. at 88-9.
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often claim a method for using the test itself, a doctor who utilizes a
particular test to diagnose a patient may find herself suddenly being sued
for patent infringement. Furthermore, doctors or medical practices
unwilling or unable to afford licensing fees for particular tests may
disadvantage their patients by using outdated or less-effective diagnostic
tests instead of the more-effective patented ones. Any efforts to create a
test that clearly defines the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods must
account for these concerns.

II.

Patents Claiming Applications of Natural Phenomena: The Thicket
of Prior Jurisprudence

As with any legally and scientifically complicated area, the
jurisprudence surrounding the patent eligibility of diagnostic tests is a
quagmire. The differing decisions in recent, similarly situated cases such as
Ariosa and Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. highlight
the differences in opinions regarding the patentability of diagnostic tests
between the USPTO, the district courts, the Federal Circuit, and the
Supreme Court. 42 Throughout the years, courts have attempted many
iterations of a test for patent eligibility of processes applying natural
phenomena and will likely continue to renew and refine such tests as the
area continues to expand.
A.

Preemption is Not the Sole Basis for Ineligibility

In 1978, the Supreme Court limited the patent-eligibility of claims
directed towards an application of a natural principle. In reversing a
Federal Circuit decision, the Supreme Court held that the use of an
algorithm that did not preempt all other uses of that algorithm was a
patent-eligible process under Gottschalk v. Benson. 43 The Court held that
whether the patent claim would prevent any other use of the natural
phenomenon is not the only test for patent eligibility. Instead, the Court
found the claims ineligible because their only novel feature was the
natural principle itself (an abstract idea—namely, a mathematical
algorithm for converting binary-coded numerals into pure binary). The
Court also stated that “conventional post-solution activity” does not
render the process patentable because a wily inventor could easily add
some form of post-solution activity to any algorithm. 44 Conventional postsolution activity is any step already known in the field added to the
process afterward to distinguish it. Adding these kinds of steps to a claim
42.

See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
2015); See also Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).

43.

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587-8 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 72
(1972).

44.

Parker, 437 U.S. at 589-90.
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on a natural phenomenon is not sufficient to render that claim patent
eligible. For example, “the Pythagorean theorem would not have been
patentable . . . because a patent application contained a final step
indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to
existing surveying techniques.” 45 However, the Court gave no definition of
“conventional post-solution activity” and added that a process is clearly
not patent-ineligible merely because it applies a natural principle. 46
B.

The Machine or Transformation Test

In 1981, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of patent eligibility of
applications of natural principles in Diamond v. Diehr, finding that though
the claimed process was an application of an algorithm, it was patent
eligible because it was a specific use of that algorithm specifically tied to a
machine designed for that use. 47 In determining the eligibility of the
claims, the Court determined that when claims apply a natural principle in
the context of a structure or process that, when viewed in totality, is
“performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect
(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing),”
then that process is patent eligible under § 101. 48 This test became known
as the “machine or transformation test.”
In 2010, the Supreme Court revisited the “machine or transformation
test” and held that it was not the sole factor in determining patentability
of a process claiming application of a natural principle. 49 In Bilski v.
Kappos, the Supreme Court held that though the Federal Circuit had
reached the correct result and invalidated the patent, they had incorrectly
applied the machine or transformation test as the sole test for patenteligibility. 50 The patent at issue in Bilski sought to claim “both the concept
of hedging risk and the application of that concept to energy markets.” 51
This natural principle is an abstract idea, a mathematical formula that
describes the well-known concept of hedging risk, such as by use of hedge
funds. The inventors argued that because the hedging formula was
designed for use by a computer, it was tied to a specific machine and thus
patent eligible under the machine or transformation test. The Court held
that though being tied to a specific machine or transformation of an
article is a clue that a process is patentable, there is nothing in the
definition of process that explicitly requires that a process be related to a
45.

Id. at 590.

46.

Id.

47.

Diamond v. Diehr, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (1981).

48.

Id.

49.

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).

50.

See id. at 3231.

51.

Id. at 3229.
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machine or transformation in order to be patentable. 52 The process in
Bilski was patent ineligible, not because it lacked ties to a specific machine
or transformation, but rather because it was directed at an unpatentable
abstract idea, the concept of risk hedging itself, and the mathematical
formula describing that concept. 53
Patent claims directed to processes that are not directly linked to a
machine or transformation of an article are not per se ineligible. Further
examination must be undertaken to see whether, firstly, the claimed
process is considered a process under § 101 and secondly, whether the
process is claiming patent-ineligible subject matter. 54 In Bilski, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that the claimed
process was in fact claiming a natural principle but gave no exact guidance
as to how it reached the conclusion that the claimed process did not
qualify as a process under § 101. 55 Instead, the Court stated that it “need
not define further what constitutes a patentable ‘process,’ beyond
pointing to the definition of that term provided in § 100(b) 56 and looking
to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.” 57
C.

The Mayo Two-Step

As questions of patent eligibility continued to arise, the Supreme
Court realized that it was necessary to provide further guidance on the
matter of whether claims were a patent-eligible application of a natural
principle or whether they were claiming the underlying natural
phenomenon itself and thus not patentable. In Mayo Collaborative
Services, Inc. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court again
refined its test for patent eligibility, condensing it into a two-step test that
has become known as the “Mayo Two-Step.” The first step is a
determination of whether the claims at issue are directed to patentineligible subject matter, such as a natural phenomenon, abstract idea, or
product of nature. 58 If the answer is no, the invention is presumed to be
patent eligible under § 101. If the answer to the first question is yes, the
second question is whether the elements of the claim contain an inventive
concept that sufficiently transforms the natural principle into patent52.

Id. at 3226-27.

53.

Id. at 3231.

54.

See id. at 3229-3230.

55.

Id. at 3230.

56.

35 U.S.C § 100(b) (2012) (“The term “process” means process, art, or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material”).

57.

Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231.

58.

Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (applying the
first step of the Mayo framework).
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eligible material. 59 In other words, the question is whether the invention
or process is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.” 60 The
question remains as to what constitutes an “inventive concept” that
“sufficiently transforms” the natural phenomena into “significantly more.”
The Court gave some limited guidance on the issue by stating that in order
to be a patent-eligible application, the transformation must be more than
simply stating the natural principle and saying “apply it.” 61
Currently, the Mayo Two-Step is the test used for analyzing patent
claims directed at diagnostic tests. However, as shown in their recent
concurrences with the Federal Circuit’s denial of Sequenom’s petition for
rehearing en banc, both Judge Lourie and Judge Dyk take issue with the
Mayo Two-Step as far as its application to diagnostic tests is concerned. 62
Judge Lourie writes that though the claims in Ariosa recite novel and
creative uses of a natural phenomenon, rather than claiming the
phenomenon itself, “applying Mayo, we are unfortunately obliged to
divorce the additional steps from the asserted natural phenomenon to
arrive at a conclusion that they add nothing innovative to the process.” 63
Judge Dyk, agreeing with Judge Lourie’s opinion, stated that he
share[s] the concerns of some of [his] colleagues that a too
restrictive test for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with
respect to laws of nature (reflected in some of the language in
Mayo) may discourage development and disclosure of new
diagnostic and therapeutic methods in the life sciences, which are
often driven by discovery of new natural laws and phenomena. 64

Though they believe that the language of the test is clear enough,
neither Federal Circuit judge agrees that the Mayo test is the correct
standard for use in the realms of diagnostic tests and the medical field.
Judge Dyk further adds that he thinks the time has come for the Supreme
Court to issue additional guidance on the matter. 65
D.

The Ultramercial Factors

The Supreme Court specifically mentions that, had it upheld the
claims in Mayo, it would have risked “disproportionately tying up the use
59.

Id. at 2357 (applying the second step of the Mayo framework).

60.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).

61.

Id.

62.

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285-1287 (Fed. Cir.
2015).

63.

Id. at 1286.

64.

Id. at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring).

65.

Id. at 1293.
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of their underlying natural laws.” 66 This language essentially describes the
preemption test that was the Court’s original test for patent eligibility. The
Court seems to be including preemption as a factor in its Mayo Two-Step,
though it does not explicitly designate it as one. Its continual usage of the
language of preemption, even without specifically designating preemption
as a factor, reinforces the importance of preemption in the patentability
analysis.
In its first decision on Ultramercial, wherein Ultramercial claimed a
method for distributing products over the Internet using a facilitator, the
Federal Circuit listed preemption among the factors to be used in
determining whether a claim is meaningfully limited, therefore turning the
natural principle into “significantly more.” 67 Interestingly, in the second
Ultramercial opinion (“Ultramercial II”), wherein the Federal Circuit retried
the case after the Supreme Court vacated the holding, preemption is no
longer designated a factor for consideration. 68
Ultramercial II outlines several considerations to take into account
when performing the Mayo Two-Step test. 69 After determining under the
first Mayo step that a claimed process is directed to a patent-ineligible
concept, one must then determine whether the limitations of the claims
are sufficient to transform the natural principle into “significantly more”
than a patent on only the natural principle. 70 The court in Ultramercial
opined that in order to “sufficiently transform,” the claims must constitute
more than adding routine additional steps specified at a high level of
generality. 71 Steps that are stated generally, such as “gather data,” do not
add anything novel to the process, particularly because there is no defined
method that a user must implement to gather the data. The court also
cited Bilski, stating that restricting claims to a particular technological
environment is not a sufficient transformation. 72 The court then applied
the machine or transformation test as a third factor. 73
As discussed, the 2014 Ultramercial opinion eliminates the idea of
preemption as a consideration in the patent-eligibility analysis. This seems
to be an odd choice in light of other opinions, which have repeatedly

66.

Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S.Ct. at 1294.

67.

See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1345-1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
vacated, 134 S.Ct. 2870, remanded, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

68.

See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 713-714 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

69.

Id. at 715.

70.

Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S.Ct. at 1294.

71.

Ultramercial Inc., 772 F.3d at 716.

72.

Id.

73.

See id. at 716-717.
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stated that preventing preemption of natural principles is a key purpose of
§ 101 principles. 74
E.

The Problem of Diehr

Further adding to the confusion is the Supreme Court’s decision in
Diamond v. Diehr, which, despite its continued status as good law, seems
to defy logic in the face of the Court’s current tests. In Diehr, the Court
held that the claimed process, which used the Arrhenius equation (a
mathematical representation of a natural principle—the temperature
dependence of certain reaction rates) to cure rubber, was a patent-eligible
application of the equation because it was tied to a specific machine or
process and did not claim the equation itself. 75
There is no mention in the opinion of whether the steps in the process
were novel outside of their application to the newly discovered
equation. 76 The Mayo opinion attempts to reconcile this difficulty by
saying that the process in Diehr was patentable “because of the way the
additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as
a whole.” 77 The Court then distinguishes Diehr from Flook by saying that in
Flook, the invention preempted all other uses of the natural principle and
the other steps in the process were conventional. 78 This reasoning implies
that the steps in Diehr must have been something other than well-known
in the rubber-curing field. This is untrue, as the rubber-curing industry
already knew that the Arrhenius equation could be used to model the cure
time the rubber press needed. 79 The problem was that using the equation
required constant recalculation, which was both difficult and timeconsuming. Diehr’s invention solved that problem by using a computer to
continuously measure the temperature inside the press and feed those
temperatures into the equation, continuously recalculating the curing
time. 80
In Alice v. CLS Bank, the Court interpreted Diehr differently, stating
that the claims in Diehr were eligible because they improved a process
that was already known in the art by applying the Arrhenius equation 81
74.

See Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Collaborative, 628 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (stating that preemption was a rationale behind the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bilski, Benson, Flook, and Diehr).

75.

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93; KEITH J. LAIDLER, CHEMICAL KINETICS 39 (3rd
ed. 1987).

76.

See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 191.

77.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012).

78.

Id. at 1299.

79.

Diamond, 450 U.S. at 177-79.

80.

Id.

81.

Alice Corp. Prop. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
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These differing interpretations of the rationale for patent eligibility in
Diehr directly apply to the problem of determining the patentability of
diagnostic methods.
If the characterization in Mayo is correct, then the main inquiry in the
analysis of whether a diagnostic test is patentable is whether the
additional steps of the process are in and of themselves novel
contributions to the field of the invention. This limits patent eligibility for
diagnostic tests to those tests that discover and create an entirely new
method of use for a natural principle. If the characterization of Diehr in
Alice is correct, the inquiry is whether the application of the natural
principle to conventional steps in the art improves the process as a whole.
This would allow those diagnostic tests that discover a new natural
principle and apply that principle in a specific use, regardless of whether
the steps of that use were conventionally known, to be patent eligible.
This much-broader inquiry seems to align more with the rationales of the
patent system in its entirety. In no other section in the patent code is
there a requirement such as the one characterized by Mayo’s treatment
of Diehr. As discussed in Section IV, other sections of the patent code
allow inventions that are a newly ordered combination of steps that are
already fully known in the art to be considered novel. 82

III.

The Ariosa Decision

A.

Factual Background

The claims in Ariosa v. Sequenom are directed to an application of cellfree fetal DNA (cffDNA) that uses the cffDNA for non-invasive fetal testing.
Cell-free fetal DNA is a natural phenomenon that occurs during pregnancy
wherein DNA from the fetus sheds into the mother’s bloodstream. 83
Sequenom’s first patent claim is directed to
a method for detecting a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal
origin performed on a maternal serum or plasma sample from a
pregnant female, which method comprises amplifying a paternally
inherited nucleic acid from the serum or plasma sample and
detecting the presence of a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal
origin in the sample. 84

The other two independent claims contain additional or substituted
steps, such as removing all nucleated or anucleated cells from the blood
82.

See Infra Part IV.

83.

See E.S. Lo et al., Transfer of Nucleated Maternal Cells into Fetal Circulation
During the Second Trimester of Pregnancy, 100 BRIT. J. HAEMATOLOGY 605 (1998).

84.

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938, 941 (N.D. Cal.
2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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sample 85 or obtaining a non-cellular fraction of the blood sample. 86 All
three independent claims stem from the discovery by two of the inventors
that cffDNA is present in maternal serum and plasma and that it can be
used for non-invasive fetal testing, which was not previously known.
Prior to Sequenom’s invention, medical professionals were limited to
more invasive prenatal diagnostic methods, such as amniocentesis or
villus sampling. 87 These types of invasive tests carry a variety of risks:
miscarriage, leaking amniotic fluid, needle injury to the fetus, Rh
sensitization, and infection or infection transmission. 88 The test developed
by Sequenom, marketed under the name Maternit21, 89 allows noninvasive testing to determine such things as sex and blood type and to
diagnose fetal abnormalities, and pre-eclampsia in the mother. 90 The test
only requires a maternal blood sample. 91
The district court found that the use of the natural principle, the
cffDNA, was the only inventive concept in the claims, so the claims were
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and the patent was thusly
invalid. The district court also held that Sequenom’s patent was an
attempt to preempt all other uses of the natural principle because the
articles cited by Sequenom detailing other methods for detecting cffDNA,
not limited to the methods disclosed in the patent, had been published
after the issuance of Sequenom’s patent. 92
B.

The Federal Circuit’s Decision

The Federal Circuit applied the Mayo Two-Step framework in its
analysis of Sequenom’s claims. Finding first that the claims were directed
to a natural principle, the court then began an examination of whether the
steps of the claim contained a sufficient inventive concept to transform
the natural principle into patent-eligible subject matter. The court held
that the steps of amplifying the cffDNA (duplicating or creating identical
DNA until there is a sufficient amount to detect) and detecting the cffDNA
85.

Id. at 942.

86.

Id.

87.

Id. at 941.

88.

See MAYO CLINIC, RISKS OF AMNIOCENTESIS (2015); MAYO CLINIC, RISKS OF CHORIONIC VILLUS
SAMPLING (2015).

89.

LABORATORIES
(2015),
Maternit21,
SEQUENOM
https://laboratories.sequenom.com/providers/maternit21plus/?gclid=CIuokvXS8sgCFQ6maQodwyMKBA.

90.

See Ariosa Diagnostics Inc., 19 F.Supp.3d at 941.

91.

See MaterniT 21, supra note 89.

92.

See Ariosa Diagnostics Inc., 19 F.Supp.3d at 954 (“[E]ven assuming that the
articles disclose alternative methods of detecting cffDNA, Sequenom has failed
to show that any alternative methods existed at the time of the invention or at
the time of issuance of the patent.” (emphasis added)).
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fragments were not inventive steps that sufficiently transformed the
natural principle in order to make it patent-eligible. 93 The steps were not
inventive or transformative because steps to amplify and detect DNA were
already well-known in the field of medicine and Sequenom’s only addition
was the application of the steps to the newly discovered cffDNA.
The Federal Circuit mentioned, but failed to fully address, the issue of
preemption, stating that “in this case, Sequenom’s attempt to limit the
breadth of the claims by showing alternative uses of cffDNA outside the
scope of the claims does not change the conclusion that the claims are
directed to patent ineligible subject matter.” 94 The court never addressed
whether Sequenom’s demonstration of alternative cffDNA uses was
sufficient to show that the natural phenomena is not preempted by its
claims.
C.

Comparison with the Genetic Technologies Decision

In contrast to the decision in Ariosa, in Genetic Technologies Ltd. v.
Agilent Technologies, Inc., the Northern District of California found that
amplification of genomic DNA was not an insignificant step because it was
meaningfully limited under the Ultramercial factors. 95 The Genetic
Technologies decision is interesting because its factual similarity to Ariosa
highlights the problem areas in the field of patent-eligibility.
The technology in both cases is directed to a natural principle that
others in the scientific community felt was unimportant. As discussed in
Section IV(b) below, industry skepticism in regard to a proposed invention
is a consideration to be taken into account when determining whether an
invention may have been obvious under § 103. 96 In Genetic Technologies,
the natural principle was that the non-coding regions of a DNA strand
(introns) may be linked to the presence of certain alleles in the coding
portions (exons). 97 The claims at issue were directed at a process for
amplifying and analyzing the intron portions of the DNA strand to see
what alleles presented in the exon DNA portions. 98 Applying the Federal
Circuit’s factors in Ultramercial to the Mayo Two-Step, the district court
held that the addition of the amplification and analysis steps were an
inventive concept that effectively transformed the natural principle into
more than a claim to the natural principle itself. 99 This stands in contrast
93.

See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2015).

94.

Id. at 1379.

95.

See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

96.

See infra Part IV.B.

97.

Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 24 F.Supp.3d 922, 926 (N.D.Cal. 2014).

98.

See id.

99.

Id. at 930; See Ultramercial, Inc., 722 F.3d at 1348.
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to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariosa, where the steps of amplification
and analysis did not sufficiently transform the natural principle using the
Mayo Two-Step test. 100 The court in Genetic Technologies distinguishes its
decision from Ariosa by stating that the amplification step in the case is
limited to a specific manner of amplification using a primer pair that spans
a non-coding sequence. 101 If this is the case, and the only thing
invalidating Sequenom’s patent in Ariosa is that it did not designate a
method by which the amplification should take place, then the
requirement of claiming a specific method should be clearly established so
that it may be taken into account during patent prosecution and
subsequent examination by the USPTO.
There is still a need for the courts to decide whether to integrate the
Ultramercial factors with the Mayo Two-Step test. Without a unified
guiding standard, the patent-eligibility of diagnostic methods will remain a
mystery to patent applicants, the USPTO, and the courts.

IV. The Patent Code as a Whole: Examining § 101 in Light of the
Other Sections
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayo states that too much reliance
on later sections of the patent code may render § 101 superfluous.
However, the Supreme Court “recognize[s] that, in evaluating the
significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and,
say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.” 102 There may
indeed be value in importing language from holdings in the §§ 102 and
103 areas of law to help decode the language of the § 101 inquiry. For
example, the terms “inventive concept,” “process,” and “transformation”
have all been used and defined in the jurisprudence surrounding §§ 102
and 103.
These definitions should be considered in order to aid the § 101
inquiry of patent eligibility, especially in the case of terms that are used in
multiple sections, such as “inventive concept,” “process,” and
“transformation.”
A.

§ 102: Anticipation, the Inventive Step, and Transformation

Under the Mayo Two-Step test, in order to be patent eligible, claims
directed to applications of natural principles must include an “inventive
step” that “sufficiently transforms” the natural principle into patenteligible subject matter. 103 Under this test, new combinations of steps that
100. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
101. See Genetic Tech. Ltd., 24 F.Supp.3d at 932.
102. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012).
103. Id. at 1294.
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were previously known in the art are not patent-eligible when they are
directed at a natural principle. For this reason, the Federal Circuit rejected
the claims in Ariosa, because adding the steps of amplification and
detection to the natural principle of cffDNA was not considered to be an
inventive step that transformed the cffDNA into eligible matter. This
analysis differs from the jurisprudence that exists regarding § 102 novelty
and § 103 non-obviousness.
Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, in order to patent a device, method, or
process, it must not only be directed to patent-eligible subject matter, but
it must also be novel. 104 In the field of patent law, practitioners say that an
invention was not “anticipated” by the prior art. 105 For an invention to lack
novelty, a single prior-art reference must disclose every element or
limitation of that invention. 106 This means that every aspect of an
invention must be described in one piece of prior art, like a single patent
or research paper. The USPTO cannot combine two prior inventions to
render the inventor’s patented invention ineligible.107 The single reference
requirement is important because it demonstrates the Court’s belief that
combining previously known steps is in and of itself an inventive step. 108 If
creating a combination of known art was not considered inventive, then
there would be no reason to specify that all elements and limitations must
be disclosed in a single prior reference; combinations of references would
be allowed to disprove novelty.
If the court had imported this language to the analysis of § 101 to help
determine whether an inventive step occurred, the claims in Ariosa may
well have been allowed. The combination of the steps—amplifying the
cffDNA and detecting the cffDNA—had not been disclosed previously by
any other reference, because cffDNA was a newly discovered
phenomenon.

104. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2012).
105. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 264 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 4th ed.
2017).
106. Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999); See NARD,
supra note 105, at 42 (“Prior art is knowledge—for example patents and
publications—accessible to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the date of
invention (pre-AIA timeframe) or before the effective filing date (post-AIA
timeframe)”).
107. See U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, 2141 Examination Guidelines for Determining
Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 [R-07.2015], Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure
(9th
ed.,
2015),
available
at:
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2141.html.
108. See U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, 2143 Examples of Basic Requirements of a Prima
Facie Case of Obviousness [R-08.2012], Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(9th
ed.,
2015),
available
at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2143.html.
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B.

§ 103: Non-Obviousness, Secondary Considerations, and the PHOSITA

Like the determination of patent eligibility under §101, the inquiry of
non-obviousness also requires that there be an inventive step or
transformation that would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the invention’s field. 109 In Graham v. John Deere, the Supreme
Court outlined several factors that must be used in order to establish a
prima facie case of obviousness. 110 However, a prima facie case of
obviousness may be rebutted through the use of secondary
considerations. Generally, secondary considerations include such factors
as (1) whether the invention has been a commercial success, (2) whether
there has been industry praise and unexpected results, (3) whether other
companies or inventors have copied the invention, (4) whether before the
invention there had been industry skepticism with respect to the idea, (5)
whether customers and competitors were willing to license for the use of
the inventions, and (6) whether the invention addressed some long-felt
but unresolved need in the field of the invention. 111
There is value in applying these secondary considerations to the
inquiry of patent-eligibility as well. Patent law seeks to reward those who
bring novel and necessary innovation into the public domain. Secondary
considerations are, in many ways, a measure of how much the public
benefits from an invention. Large benefit to the public is a clue that an
invention contains an inventive concept, because if it were not inventive,
why would companies be willing to license it? Why would consumers be
willing to purchase it? Why would others in the field not have discovered
it already?
There may also be a patent-eligibility benefit in determining who is
the person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) for the field of art in
which the invention is situated. 112 Patent law places great value on
examining a patent from the viewpoint of a typical practitioner. 113 Would
a typical PHOSITA have believed that the invention was patent eligible?
The PHOSITA serves as a measure of the general state of mind of those in
the field regarding the invention. Due to the lack of clarity in the field of
patent eligibility, this factor may be harder to use effectively, but there is
still value in determining whether the average person in the art would
believe that the claimed invention is patent eligible. If the typical PHOSITA
109. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
110. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1966).
111. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc.,
699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
112. See NARD, supra note 105.
113. See 2107 Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with the
Utility Requirement[R:11.2013], U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2107.html (last modified Nov.
4, 2015).
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would not believe the claimed process is eligible, then that would be a
factor against eligibility.
A court determines the PHOSITA using the relevant factors laid out in
Daiichi v. Apotex: (1) the education level of the inventor, (2) the typical
types of problems in the field and who works on those problems, (3) the
inventors of any prior-art solutions to problems in the field, (4) how
rapidly advancements in the field are developed, (5) the technology’s
sophistication, and most importantly (6) the average education level of
active workers in the field of the art. 114
In the field of diagnostic tests, the PHOSITA is typically a doctor,
particularly those who specialize in the application of diagnostics, though
the inventor of a diagnostic test is more likely to be a medical researcher
or other academic. This distinction can be valuable when determining
patentability. Would a typical doctor in the field of diagnostics find the
claimed invention to be something new and non-obvious and thus
deserving of a patent?

V.

A Proposed Test for Patent-Eligibility of Diagnostic Methods

A.

A Summary of the Current Problems with the Test for Patentability

As it stands, the Supreme Court in Mayo held that for an application
of a natural principle—i.e., a diagnostic test—to be patent eligible, the
inventive concept that transforms the natural principle must be more than
an application of routine or conventional steps in the medical field. This
conflicts with earlier language in the opinion wherein the Court directly
quoted Diehr stating that “the application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection”. 115 These conflicting statements make it
difficult to determine when the application of a natural principle to a
known process creates a patent eligible claim.
Section 100 of the America Invents Act (“Act”) defines terms used in
the context of the patent statutes. 116 However, there are still clarifications
for the court system to make regarding these terms. For example, the Act
defines the term “process” as including a new use of a known process or
composition of matter. 117 It is unclear whether this definition would
extend to patents that claim the application of a known process to a newly
discovered natural phenomenon, such as the patent at issue in Ariosa. 118
114. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
115. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293-94
(2012) (emphasis added).
116. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
118. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
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Under the language of § 100(b), Ariosa would appear to be a new use of a
known process (applying the known process of amplifying and detecting
DNA to the newly discovered natural phenomenon of cffDNA fragments),
which, under the Supreme Court’s language in Bilski, would establish
strong evidence that the claimed process is patent eligible. 119 Despite
attempted clarification, the vagueness of language such as “inventive
concept” and “sufficiently transforms” leave a test that is not as clear as it
could be. As Judge Dyk noted in his concurrence with the denial of
Sequenom’s petition for rehearing en banc, “there is a problem with Mayo
insofar as it concludes that inventive concept cannot come from
discovering something new in nature—e.g., identification of a previously
unknown natural relationship or property.” 120 Diagnostic tests that rely on
newly discovered laws of nature may be ill-suited to a patent-eligibility
analysis that uses the Mayo test. The field needs a clear test for whether a
diagnostic test that has its basis in a law of nature is patent eligible. To
that end, I discuss suggested solutions and propose a novel test for patent
eligibility of diagnostic methods.
B.

Two Alternate Solutions

Some academics suggest alternate solutions for clarifying the area of
diagnostic methods. The two main solutions proposed as alternatives to
reshaping the Mayo Two-step are (1) amending § 101, and (2) creating a
separate section of the United States Code applicable only to patents on
diagnostic methods similar to section § 161, which applies to plant
patents. 121
In response to a slew of patent invalidations that followed in the wake
of the Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank decision, attorney Robert Sachs detailed
a series of proposed changes to § 101. 122 His proposed changes include
definitional changes that would fall in line with how many scientists
interpret language surrounding natural phenomena and abstract ideas.
Further solutions offered, some of which have already been discussed
earlier in this Note, include adding a safe harbor section that creates a
presumption of eligibility, determining eligibility based on a PHOSITA’s
viewpoint, and returning to a test of eligibility on the basis of nonpreemption. 123
119. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010) (stating that the Court doesn’t
need to define a patent-eligible process beyond guiding people to § 100(b)).
120. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Dyk, J., concurring).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012).
122. See Robert R. Sachs, Twenty-Two Ways Congress Can Save Section 101, FENWICK &
WEST
BILSKI
BLOG
(Feb.12,
2015),
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-can-savesection-101.html.
123. See id.
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Another suggested alternative is creating an entirely new statute that
deals specifically with patenting inventions in the medical field. In 1930,
Congress created a new statute dealing specifically with human-designed
varieties of plants. This statute, 35 U.S.C. Chapter 15 §§ 161-164, has its
own set of requirements distinct from those outlined for typical
patents. 124 A statute created specifically for patents in the medical field
could likewise have distinct requirements.
The resistance to these alternatives is often practical, rather than
intellectual. They would almost certainly work, but why go through the
arduous task of amending 101 or creating an entirely new statutory
section to specifically encompass diagnostic tests when there is nothing in
the original § 101 that excludes them? Diagnostic tests were excluded on
the basis of jurisprudence, and by jurisprudence they are most effectively
reinstated. Furthermore, the area of § 101 eligibility could use clarification
as a whole, not merely in the medical field or the field of diagnostic tests
in particular. Amending the statute or creating an entirely new statute
may fix one problem area, but when new ones arise, a new test that
makes certain the framework for patent eligibility is a solution that can be
applied over numerous fields.
C.

The Proposed Test

To provide much-needed clarity, there are several factors that should
be taken into account in determining the patent eligibility of a diagnostic
test. No one factor should be dispositive of patentability, but rather their
impact should be balanced in order to reach a reasoned conclusion on
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The first step in determining the patent eligibility of a diagnostic test is
to apply the Supreme Court’s Mayo test. 125 However, the application
should be done using the interpretations of the “process,” “inventive
step,” and “transformation” language imported from the jurisprudence
surrounding sections § 102 and § 103, as discussed in Section IV above. 126
This means that the application of conventional steps to a newly
discovered natural phenomenon should be considered an “inventive
step,” just as it would be under the § 102 analysis. If the claims at issue fail
the application of the Mayo Two-Step, they are presumed to be patentineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, that presumption may be
rebutted using steps two and three, as outlined below.
The second step in determining the diagnostic method’s patentability
is to determine whether the claimed method is sufficiently narrow in
scope and whether it has been reduced to practice. Reduction to practice
124. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2012).
125. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-97
(2012).
126. See supra Part IV.
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typically requires “the inventor to prove that the claimed invention works
for its intended purpose, which typically involves the inventor constructing
and testing a prototype of the invention.” 127 In his concurrence with
Sequenom’s denial for rehearing en banc, Judge Dyk reiterates that undue
preemption is the main fear behind allowing a patent on a law of nature.
For that reason, Judge Dyk stated that “if the breadth of the claim is
sufficiently limited to a specific application of the new law of nature
discovered by the patent applicant and reduced to practice, [he] think[s]
that the novelty of the discovery should be enough to supply the
necessary inventive concept.” 128 The paired requirements of reduction to
practice and narrowly tailored claims prevent undue preemption of the
natural principle by limiting the patent to the specifically claimed
application. If the patent-seeking diagnostic method is both reduced to
practice and has claims that are narrowly tailored, those factors may rebut
a presumption of unpatentability, especially if the third step also points to
a finding of eligibility.
The third step is an analysis of secondary considerations. Secondary
considerations may be used in conjunction with step two to rebut a
presumption of patent ineligibility. This step has less weight than step
two, meaning that multiple factors must weigh in favor of patentability for
the presumption to be rebutted. The main secondary considerations
include the Transocean factors, namely, (1) whether the invention has
been a commercial success, (2) whether there has been industry praise or
if the results achieved by the invention were unexpected, (3) whether
other companies have copied the invention, (4) whether before the
success of the invention there had been skepticism in the industry with
regard to the idea, (5) whether customers and competitors were willing to
license the invention, and (6) whether the invention resolved a long-felt
need in the industry. 129 As explained in Section IV(B), these factors point
toward a finding of eligibility because they demonstrate a very real need
in the industry for the product that is being developed. 130
These considerations can rebut the presumption of patent ineligibility
that occurs when a diagnostic test fails the Mayo Two-Step test. The test is
particularly useful in regard to diagnostic methods that use an application
of a newly discovered natural principle, as they are often rejected. Judge
Dyk “worr[ies] that method claims that apply newly discovered natural
laws and phenomena in somewhat conventional ways are screened out by

127. NARD, supra note 105, at 264.
128. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Dyk, J., concurring).
129. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699
F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
130. See supra Part IV.B.
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the Mayo test.” 131 Rather than disregard those contributions entirely, they
should serve as a means to rebut the Mayo Two-Step.
The novelty of the test comes from the three pieces added to the
current Mayo Two-Step analysis: importing definitions from the
jurisprudence surrounding §§ 102 and 103, the step of determining
reduction to practice and sufficiently limited claim scope, and finally, the
step of applying secondary considerations. The test improves the existing
Mayo standard by adding the ability to rebut the initial finding of patent
ineligibility using the narrowed language of the claim and actual reduction
to practice. These additions are an improvement because they widen the
scope of the test, allowing diagnostic tests that are an application of a
newly discovered natural principle to be patent eligible, even if the steps
applied to that principle are not themselves novel. The addition of the
third step, allowing secondary considerations to be taken into account to
rebut a presumption of unpatentability, hearkens back to the purpose of
patent law itself. At its heart, patent law is about bringing innovative and
new inventions to the public. Secondary considerations take into account
the effect the invention has had on its given field. Factors such as whether
the invention has been copied illustrate that there is a need in the field for
the invention. An invention that is a needed improvement to its field is the
exact feature that patent law seeks to reward.
Some of the potential objections to the test have been addressed in
Section V(B) above. Most notably, the limitations on patent eligibility of
diagnostic tests were created through jurisprudence, and altering that
jurisprudence is the path to most easily remedying them.
D.

Applying the Proposed Test to Ariosa

Applying this Note’s proposed test to the technology at issue in
Ariosa, it becomes evident that the determination of patent-eligibility as it
regards the process of non-invasive fetal testing using cffDNA would be
different than the Federal Circuit’s decision.
First, we must apply the Mayo Two-Step test to the technology at
issue. In the Federal Circuit’s 2015 Ariosa decision, the court first found
that the claims at issue were based on a natural phenomenon. 132 It then
addressed the second step of the framework in order to determine if the
use of the cffDNA described in the claims sufficiently transformed the
natural principle of cffDNA into a patent-eligible method. The Federal
Circuit held that the steps of cffDNA amplification and detection did not
sufficiently transform the cffDNA to render the method patent eligible. 133
However, under the proposed test, one would import the language
regarding transformation from § 102, which considers a new combination
131. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1289.
132. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
133. See id. at 1376-77.
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of steps previously known in the art to be an inventive step. The
application of previously known steps such as amplification and detection
to the newly discovered phenomenon of cffDNA would be a sufficient
transformation of the natural principle for that method to become patent
eligible because it is an application of known steps to a previously
unknown phenomenon, thus creating a new combination. However, if the
Courts found that the claims at issue in Ariosa still did not reach the level
of patent eligibility after applying the Mayo test, the following two steps
of the proposed test could rebut that finding of unpatentability.
In order to determine whether the presumption of unpatentability
could be rebutted, a court would have to determine whether the claims at
issue were narrowly tailored and whether the invention itself had been
reduced to practice. In Ariosa, the claims at issue were limited to a
particular use of the cffDNA. Through amplification and detection, medical
practitioners could use the cffDNA fragments as a non-invasive fetal
diagnostic test. This is a narrow application of the natural phenomenon of
cffDNA; it does not prevent cffDNA from being used in other applications
unrelated to fetal testing or in fetal testing applications that do not use
the steps of both amplification and detection. Furthermore, the testing
method has been fully reduced to practice. Sequenom has already
marketed its method under the name Maternit21, which demonstrates
that it is a fully realized invention that works for its intended purpose. 134
The combination of the narrowly tailored claim and the reduction to
practice demonstrates that Sequenom’s invention does not seek to
preempt all other uses of the natural principle of cffDNA. These factors
support a finding that the technology at issue should be patent eligible.
Finally, if the above considerations were still found to be insufficient,
secondary considerations should also be applied to the invention in
Ariosa. This would allow a court to see whether there is a need in the
medical field that outweighs a preliminary finding of patent ineligibility.
With regard to commercial success and industry praise, the Maternit21
test has wide market application and has seen high levels of success. 135
With regard to previous industry skepticism and unexpected results, prior
to Sequenom’s discovery, medical practitioners regarded the maternal
plasma or serum that contains the cffDNA as waste material and discarded
it, 136 implying that the material is worthless. Since the industry regarded
the material as waste, the fact that Sequenom created a worthwhile and
beneficial test from that waste material, one that solves a huge problem
of high-risk prenatal tests, should be heralded as an unexpected result.
In considering whether the invention addressed some long-felt need
in the medical field, one must only look to the previous methods for fetal
134. See Maternit21, supra note 89.
135. See id.
136. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1373.
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testing and the inherent risks in those procedures. Amniocentesis and
chorionic-villus sampling carry risks as severe as miscarriage. 137 A noninvasive fetal test like Sequenom’s is an improvement over the prior tests
and addresses the need for a safe and reliable method of fetal diagnostic
testing. With regard to copying and licensing the invention, as shown by
the infringement suit at issue in Ariosa v. Sequenom, companies such as
Ariosa began producing tests identical to Sequenom’s as soon as
Sequenom’s test hit the market. Overall, the analysis of the secondary
considerations points favorably toward patent eligibility for Sequenom’s
claims.
Under the proposed test, it is likely that Sequenom’s claimed method
for using cffDNA would be a patent-eligible use of a natural phenomenon.

Conclusion
In adopting of the Mayo Two-Step test, the Supreme Court sought to
set forth a test for determining whether an invention or method that
claims a use of a natural principle is patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In particular, the Court sought to meaningfully limit the scope of patent
eligibility to exclude those inventors who would wish to overstep their
bounds, claiming patent rights on the laws of nature themselves or
applications of those laws so broad as to be indistinguishable from the
former. For these reasons, the test limited patent eligibility of natural
principles to those inventions that contained additional steps that
sufficiently transform the phenomenon into a limited and useful
application. However, the Court did nothing to clarify the meaning of such
terms as “sufficiently transform” or “inventive concept.” These terms are
of particular importance in the field of diagnostic tests and are often the
crucial factor between a determination of eligibility and a determination
of non-eligibility. Requirements such as transformation are difficult to
quantify, particularly in the medical field. For this reason, it is necessary to
create a test that helps distinguish when a diagnostic test should be
eligible for patent protection
The proposed test clarifies these terms and facilitates the
determination of eligibility. Furthermore, the test takes into account
factors such as preemption, incentives for research, and benefit to the
public. By adopting a test such as this one, courts would be taking steps to
clarify which uses of natural principles are acceptable and which overstep
their bounds into areas of undue preemption. Courts would be returning
patent law to its roots in rewarding the creation of innovative
technologies for the benefit of the public.
137. See MAYO CLINIC, RISKS OF AMNIOCENTESIS (2015); MAYO CLINIC, RISKS OF CHORIONIC VILLUS
SAMPLING (2015);
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